

Effects of Social and Ideological Cleavages on Vote Choice in the Korean Presidential Election of December 19, 2007*

Park, Chan Wook | Seoul National University

| ABSTRACT |

This paper investigates the effects of voters' socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations on their candidate choice in the 2007 Korean presidential election. The effect of a voter's residential region on candidate choice was demonstrated by the regional cleavage of Honam versus the rest. Despite the lack of sharp generational cleavage, older voters were more likely to support Lee Myung-bak. No discernible pattern of class voting existed. However, a moderate degree of ideological cleavage in electoral support was found. Progressives favored Chung Dong-young slightly more than Lee, while centrists and conservatives overwhelmingly chose Lee over Chung. Voters' ideological self-perception has substantive meaning in the sense that it has constrained their stands on selected issues, such as the nation's most important problem and the outgoing President Roh Moo-hyun's job performance. Voters who singled out economic growth as the most important national objective indeed supported Lee much more strongly than Chung. People who judged President Roh's job performance more negatively were more likely to vote for Lee of the main opposition party. Perceived ideological distance from Lee monotonically decreased the likelihood of support for him. With the regional, generational, and ideological cleavages becoming weaker than before, Lee Myung-bak has launched his national leadership in a less divided political environment. Still, depending on his leadership style and performance, the patterns of social and ideological cleavages in electoral support will change. The Korean electorate dynamically responds to what and how the government does.

Key Words | 2007 Korean presidential election, regional cleavage, generational cleavage, ideological cleavage

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Diego, USA, March 22, 2008.

I. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate how voters' socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations have affected their candidate choice in the 17th Korean presidential election held on December 19, 2007. Twelve presidential candidates officially filed with the National Election Commission on November 25 and 26, and later two of them withdrew from the race before the polling day. In terms of the number of candidates, the election might have appeared highly competitive. But Lee Myung-bak of the Grand National Party (GNP), who was formerly Hyundai Construction CEO and also served as the mayor of the capital Seoul, won a landslide victory. Lee actually kept himself leading in the public opinion polls for about 15 months before the election day. He received 48.7 percent of the vote, defeating Chung Dong-young of the United New Democratic Party (UNDP) by a margin of 22.6 percentage points (or 5,317,708 votes).¹⁾

In the previous presidential election in 2002, the structure of competition was totally different. Roh Moo-hyun of the New Millennium Democratic Party waged a neck-and-neck election war against Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP, and obtained 48.9 percent of the vote compared to Lee's 46.6 percent. The winning margin was much narrower: 2.3 percentage points (or 570,980 votes). In this election, voters' choice revealed serious social and ideological cleavages prevailing at the time. As will be described later in this paper, electoral alignment was clearly marked by the East-West regional divide, generational gap, and progressive-conservative ideological split. President Roh Moo-hyun

1) About one and a half months before Election Day, Lee Hoi-chang who had run in the previous presidential election under the GNP banner defected from the party and declared his candidacy as an independent. This Lee came third with 15.1% of the vote.

ascended to power in such heat of divided democracy.²⁾

To what extent has Lee Myung-bak's overwhelming victory in 2007 lessened the extent of regional, generational, and ideological cleavages in voters' candidate support? How did these cleavage structures affect the vote choice in the most recent Korean presidential election? This study seeks to answer these questions using the data from a post-election survey and other supplementary sources. First of all, the study briefly describes the conceptual framework for analysis as well as the data. Second, it sketches and compares the voting results of the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections with regards to the effects of social and ideological cleavages. Third, it provides bi- and multivariate analyses to show how voters' socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations have influenced their candidate choice in the 2007 presidential election. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of the findings for cleavage politics and the politics of integration on Korea's path toward its democratic consolidation.

II. Conceptual Framework and Data

The socioeconomic characteristic of an individual describes his or her position in the society or a social network where the person interacts with others. An individual's ideological orientation is also defined in the social context, which indicates the person's belief and way of thinking about how the society does and should work. Individual socioeconomic characteristics and

2) In the 2002 presidential election, Kwon Young-ghil of the Democratic Labor Party finished far third with 3.9 percent of the vote.

ideological orientations constitute the criteria or factors for cleavage patterns in a society. People are divided along these attributes, and develop their group identities or interests accordingly. These cleavages generate political conflict when people in different groups are organized and mobilized in an attempt to seek for their identities or interests. Such cleavage politics may bring a society into ruin, and hence makes politics necessary as a means to moderate or bridge the cleavages. In brief, cleavage and integration are two faces of politics.

In a democratic system, one can hardly think of cleavage politics and the politics of integration without the working of political parties and elections. Cleavage structures in a society shape the party system—political parties seek electoral support based on social and ideological cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) provided an in-depth sociological study of the consequences of cleavage structures on voter alignment and the party system in modern western societies. Particularly, in the voting behavior research, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and their associates (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954) produced pioneering results by focusing on social cleavage factors. They attempted to explain voters' behavior in terms of their socioeconomic status indicated by education, income, and occupation; urban-rural residence type; and religion. In western societies, studies on class voting are most prevalent and have given a rise to much controversy on the continuing or declining effect of class variables on vote choice (for example, Dalton 2002).

Existing studies on voting behavior in Korean presidential and National Assembly elections since the country's democratization have emphasized a voter's region of birth or residence as the most influential cleavage factor for the vote choice (see Park 2000). A voter has region-based preference for a candidate or a party. One supports the salient candidate who hails from the voter's native region (coinciding with one's residential region for most of the people living outside the Capital region), or whose party has a strong base in the voter's native region. Next to region, the age variable has recently become

significant for explaining Korean voters' choice behavior. One may find a life-cycle effect. As a voter grows older, he or she is more likely to vote for a conservative candidate than a progressive one. When the electorate is grouped into age cohorts, the younger is more likely to choose a progressive candidate or party. Beyond a life-cycle effect, this may suggest a generation effect—the members of one age cohort sharing common socialization experience during their formative years have developed political attitudes similar among themselves but different from those of another age cohort (Chung 1995; Kang 2003; Cho 2003).

In delving into the effects of ideological orientations, this study is eclectic in drawing on both socio-psychological and economic approaches to the study of voting behavior. The Michigan group of voting studies (Campbell et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1960) posited political attitudes as determinants of vote choice. Among the attitudinal variables, the scholars of the school focused on party identification, not much on ideology and issue positions. A typical American voter in the 1950s and 1960s was depicted as an unsophisticated one with a low level of ideological constraint on issue stands. However, later studies such as *The Changing American Voter* (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976) suggested that the level of ideological thinking among the Americans rose during the 1970s. Notwithstanding the on-going controversy about the level of ideological conceptualization among the American mass public, there is no denying that in many advanced democracies voters' liberal/conservative or left/right ideological constraint on major issues provides an important clue for explicating their voting decision.

In this study, voters' ideological orientations mainly refer to their self-placement and perception of candidates' positions on the progressive /conservative continuum. The concept of ideological orientations also encompasses voters' issue positions constrained by and highly relevant to their progressive/conservative self-identification.

Downs (1957) opened a refined avenue for economic approach to the study of voting decision based on voters' ideological positions as well as those of candidates or parties. Predicated on the axiom of voters' rationality for maximizing expected utility, he suggested a spatial theory of voting. According to him, ideology is "a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society." In a world of uncertainty, a voter uses ideologies as a short cut for saving the cost of being informed on a wide range of issues (96-100). From an economic perspective, the benefit of voting is the actor's expected utility differential between the candidates or parties (38-40). The benefit is calculated based on the voter's and candidate or party's positions on the ideological space. A Downsian rational voter chooses the candidate or party nearest to him or her in terms of ideological proximity (e.g., Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Enelow and Hinich 1984). In this study, this proposition is to be empirically tested.

The main data for this study came from a post-election survey designed and conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the Seoul Broadcasting System, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research. The survey was administered to a nationwide sample of eligible voters aged 19 or more through the computer-aided telephone interviews on December 20 and 21, 2007. Telephone numbers and households were randomly selected, and within the household the respondent was chosen so that the quota based on the region, age, and sex could be fulfilled. The final size of a weighted sample is 2,111. The sample error is $\pm 2.1\%$ at the confidence level of 95 percent. The survey includes questionnaire items necessary to investigate the effects of voters' socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations on their presidential candidate choice. In addition to this dataset, the study partly utilizes the official election results publicized by the National Election Commission, and the data collected from a couple of public opinion polls. The methods of statistical analysis include simple descriptive analysis, bivariate correlation analysis,

Ordinary Least Square regression analysis, and binary logistic regression analysis. The manner of coding the variables considered in the analysis is appropriately mentioned later in this paper.

III. Social and Ideological Cleavages Compared: An Overview of 2002 and 2007 Presidential Elections

Between the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, a sharp contrast is shown in terms of regional, generational, and ideological cleavages. Let us first have a look at voters' regional alignment. Since the 1987 presidential election, voters' region-based choice behavior and the consequential regional cleavage have persisted in all of the subsequent presidential elections. Still, the results of the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections demonstrate significant differences in the pattern and extent of regional cleavage. In this democratic era, most of the major presidential candidates as well as all presidential winners have come from the Southeast (or Yeongnam, including Daegu, North Gyeongsang, Busan, Ulsan, and South Gyeongsang) and Southwest (or Honam, including Gwangju, North Jeolla, and South Jeolla) regions. In this context, regional voting particularly applies to the voters who are natives or residents of these two regions.

Regional voting was conspicuous in the 2002 election. Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP dominated in the Southeast region. As seen in <Table 1>, he received 75.5 percent of the votes in Daegu and its adjacent North Gyeongsang, and also 65.3 percent in Busan, Ulsan, and their surrounding South Gyeongsang. Lee was not actually a native son of the region, but the region continued to be a strong support base for the GNP whose predecessor parties had been led by the

former Presidents Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun of the NMDP got an overwhelming majority of the votes in the Southwest region (95.2 percent in Gwangju, 91.6 percent in North Jeolla, and 93.4 percent in South Jeolla). Roh Moo-hyun was in fact a Southeast native, but he ran as the candidate of the NMDP founded by the former President Kim Dae-jung who had enlisted fervent support as a favorite son of the region since the middle of the authoritarian era. In this election, Lee also won the most votes in the Gangwon province. Meanwhile, Roh also finished first in the Capital region (encompassing the capital city of Seoul, the metropolitan city of Incheon, and their surrounding Gyeonggi province), in the Central region (Daejeon, North Chungcheong, and South Chungcheong), and in the Jeju island. These election results clearly showed the East-West regional divide (see Figure 1; for detailed analysis, refer to Kang 2003, Kim 2003; Back et al. 2003).

In the 2007 election, Lee Myung-bak of the GNP garnered 48.7 percent of the vote nationwide, and won an emphatic victory over the runner-up Chung Dong-young who obtained 26.1 percent. As vividly demonstrated in <Figure 1>, Lee Myung-bak came up first in all the regions but the Southwest. His victory was sweeping especially in the upper Southeast region, both Lee's home ground and the bastion of his party. He scored 71.1 percent of the votes in Daegu and North Gyeongsang altogether, and 56.2 percent in Busan, Ulsan, and South Gyeongsang. These percentage figures are somewhat smaller than 75.5 percent and 65.3 percent recorded by Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP five years earlier in the two parts of the Southeast region, respectively. But it should be noted that Lee Hoi-chang declared his candidacy as an independent just one month before the election day and made inroads into Lee Myung-bak's support base. Chung Dong-young of the UNDP only secured 6.4 percent in the upper Southeast and 13.0 percent in the lower Southeast. The UNDP was reorganized in August 2007 from the Open Uri [Our Open] Party, pro-President Roh Moo-hyun party, which had split from the NMDP in November 2003. Chung, a native of the

<Table 1> Official Results of 2002 and 2007 Korean Presidential Elections, by Region (%)

Year	2002		2007	
Candidate	Lee Hoi-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Myung-bak	Chung Dong-young
Party	GNP	NMDP	GNP	UNDP
Nation	46.6	48.9	48.7	26.1
Capital region				
Seoul	45.0	51.3	53.2	24.5
Incheon/ Gyeonggi	44.3	50.5	51.4	23.6
Central	41.3	52.5	37.1	22.6
Southwest	4.9	93.2	9.0	80.0
Upper Southeast	75.5	20.2	71.1	6.4
Lower Southeast	65.3	29.4	56.2	13.0
Others				
Gangwon	52.5	41.5	52.0	18.9
Jeju	39.9	56.1	38.7	32.7

Note: The table shows the percentages received by the winner and the runner-up only, the row total for one election being less than 100 percent; GNP = Grand National Party; NMDP = New Millennium Democratic Party; UNDP = United New Democratic Party; Central = Daejeon/Chungcheon; Southwest = Gwangju/Jeolla; Upper Southeast = Daegu/North Gyeongsang; Lower Southeast = Busan/Ulsan/South Gyeongsang


Source: National Election Commission; <http://www.nec.go.kr>

Southwest, received 80 percent of the votes in the whole region (79.8 percent in Gwangju, 81.6 percent in North Jeolla, and 78.7 percent in South Jeolla). These percent figures show vehement electoral support by the Southwestern residents for their favorite son, but they are still short of the 93.2 percent obtained by Roh Moo-hyun there in the 2002 election. In this region, Lee Myung-bak of the GNP received 9.0 percent of the votes, somewhat greater than the 3.6 percent obtained by Lee Hoi-chang, the GNP candidate in the previous election. As far as the Southwest is concerned, the strength of regional voting has weakened in the 2007 election.

The pattern of regional cleavage revealed in the 2007 election is quite different from that in its preceding 2002 election. The presidential winner Lee Myung-bak came past the post first everywhere outside the Southwest, while Chung Dong-young dominated only in the Southwest. In brief, the notorious East-West regional divide has transformed into that of the Southwest versus the rest. This way the regional cleavage has lessened in the 2007 election.

The generational cleavage or gap in voting drew much attention from the analysts of the 2002 presidential election. Roh Moo-hyun was popular among the young voters in their twenties and thirties. By a sharp contrast, Lee Hoi-chang was highly favored by the old voters in their fifties and over. The exit poll conducted by the Media Research for the Korean Broadcasting System showed that roughly six out of every ten voters in their twenties or thirties cast their ballots for Roh, while about six out of every ten voters in their fifties and older supported Lee (see <Table 2>). The voters in their forties were more or

<Figure 1> Top Vote-Getter by Metropolitan City and Province



less evenly divided in their choice of Roh and Lee. Interestingly, the younger half (ages 40 to 44) favored Roh more than Lee, while the older half (ages 45 to 49) supported Lee over Roh. Such stark generational differences in the vote choice never happened before the 2002 presidential election. In this sense, this presidential election could be dubbed “war of generation” (Song 2003).

To some extent, this cleavage may be explained based on the notion of life-cycle effect. Roh Moo-hyun had a comparative advantage in candidate image so that he could be a favorite choice for the young generation less oriented toward the establishment than the old generation. As of 2002, Lee Hoi-chang was 66 years old, and Roh was 55. Lee came from an eminent family, graduated from Seoul National University College of Law, served as a Supreme Court judge and also later as a prime minister, and hence could be perceived as a conservative champion of law and order. Moreover, Lee’s two sons were exempted from mandatory military service for physical and health reasons, which gave rise to scandal and made him a symbol of the privileged. In the contrary, Roh was born into a poor farming family, received formal education up to vocational high school only, passed the state bar exam to become a judge, built his reputation as a righteous politician, and was a progressive with populist appeal.

However, the generational differences in electoral support can be fully understood by considering different socialization experiences among the age cohorts and also significant events occurring in election periods. The voters in their twenties at the time of the presidential election grew up in the atmosphere of political democratization, economic prosperity, and social diversity. Their sense of national pride and self-expression was strong. The cohort of ages 30 to 39 was represented by the “386 forces” which included those in their thirties who attended college in the 1980s after being born in the 1960s. They engaged in pro-democracy protests against the military authoritarian regime, and espoused anti-U.S. and pro-North Korea nationalism. The voters in their forties

were brought up under economically improving but still straitened conditions. They had zeal for democracy, but lacked actual democratic experiences. The voters in their fifties and over were socialized under the strong influence of anti-communism, lived through economic hardship and social unrest, and thus were highly likely to favor economic growth, national security, and social order. All this suggested the generational cleavage in electoral support greatly overlapped the ideological divide.

Besides different socialization experiences and value orientations, the events and campaigns in the election year galvanized contrasting electoral support between the young in their twenties and thirties, and the old in their fifties and over. Both the World Cup soccer games and the accident of a U.S. military vehicle in June 2002 deserve mention. The quadrennial World Cup games were co-hosted by Japan and Korea in 2002. The Korean soccer team won a series of games and finished fourth. The Korean “red devils” rooting enthusiastically for their national team were predominantly in their twenties or thirties. Several hundreds of thousands of them filled the City Hall Square and its adjacent high streets in Seoul every time the home team took the field. This event boosted national pride of the young generation. In the midst of the World Cup games, two middle school girls were accidentally run over by an armored vehicle near a U.S. military base. This accident attracted nationwide attention when the two U.S. soldiers were acquitted at a U.S. court martial in November 2002, a month before the polling day. The court decision enraged many ordinary Koreans and provoked a sudden upsurge in anti-American sentiment. Mostly young Koreans took part in countless candlelight vigils and violent demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy. The Korea-U.S. and North-South Korean relations had become major campaign issues. The conservative candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, campaigned for stronger Korea-U.S. alliance and hardliner policy toward North Korea going nuclear. On the other hand, Roh Moo-hyun advocated continued engagement with North Korea to prevent

heightened tension on the Korean peninsula. Roh expressed his objection to Bush administration's tough stance toward North Korea. In his campaign, Roh put a stress on his determination to establish an equal relationship with the U.S. (for further discussion, see Kang 2003, Song 2003, Cho 2003, Park 2005, Chung 2002, and Jaung 2003).

The exit poll results in <Table 2> hardly confirm the clear existence of generational cleavage in the 2007 presidential election. Lee Myung-bak, the conservative GNP candidate earned a greater rate of support among the old generation aged 50 or more than among the young generation aged 39 or less. About six out of every ten voters in the oldest cohort favored Lee, while some four out of every ten in the youngest cohort did so. This may correspond with the expectation based on a life-cycle effect. A more significant fact, however,

<Table 2> Presidential Vote by Age: Exit Polls in 2002 and 2007

(%)

Year	2002		2007	
Candidate	Lee Hoi-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	Lee Myung-bak	Chung Dong-young
Party	GNP	NMDP	GNP	UNDP
All	46.8	49.1	51.3	25.0
20-29/19-29 of age	31.7	62.1	42.5	20.7
30-39	33.9	59.3	40.4	28.3
40-49	48.7	47.4	50.6	27.1
(40-44)	(46.1)	(49.4)		
(45-49)	(52.7)	(44.4)		
50 or more/50-59	58.3	39.8	58.5	23.5
60 or more			58.8	24.8

Note: The table shows the percentages received by the winner and the runner-up only; and the row total for one election is less than 100 percent; GNP = Grand National Party, NMDP = New Millennium Democratic Party, UNDP = United New Democratic Party

Source: KBS-Media Research exit poll on December 19, 2002(N = 261,223); SBS-TNS Media Korea exit poll on December 19, 2007 (N = 100,000 odd)

is that Lee led Chung Dong-young of the progressive UNDP across all age cohorts. In Chung's case, the greatest level of support, which is three out of every ten within the group at most, came from the voters in their thirties. The lowest level of support for Chung was shown by those in their twenties: about two supporters out of every ten voters. There is no linear tendency of Chung's electoral support changing with age. In short, the Korean electorate has become far less divided along the generational lines in the 2007 presidential election than in 2002.

Ideological cleavage needs to be discussed on its own, though it may be closely interrelated with generational cleavage. In this study, a voter's ideology is his or her own perceived position on the progressive/conservative continuum, measured by the relevant post-election survey item. Immediately after the 2002 presidential election, the Korean Social Science Data Center conducted a survey that contained a questionnaire item measuring the respondent's ideological self-placement based on a five-point scale. On this scale, 7.1 percent of those respondents answered "(1) very progressive"; 34.0 percent, "(2) somewhat progressive"; 32.3 percent, "(3) middle of the road"; 23.5 percent, "(4) somewhat conservative"; and 3.2 percent "(5) very conservative." In the wake of a progressive candidate's victory, progressive identifiers outnumbered conservative identifiers, 41.1 percent versus 26.7 percent with 32.3 percent being in the middle.

Regarding the candidate choice item, the survey got 56.4 percent for Roh Moo-hyun, roughly 7 percentage points higher than the vote rate received by Roh, while it got 38.7 percent for Lee Hoi-chang, 8 percentage points lower than Lee's actual rate. Regardless of these discrepancies between real official and survey results, a more important question is whether or not one can find a lucid ideological cleavage, that is, a contrasted voting pattern in which a majority of progressive voters are aligned with the progressive candidate and a majority of conservatives come along with the conservative candidate. Among

every ten progressive voters, seven tended to support Roh, and three did Lee. In contrast, among every ten conservatives, six voted for Lee, and four did so for Roh. Among the voters on the center, there were somewhat more supporters for Roh, the winner than for Lee. The point is that clear evidence of ideological cleavage could be seen in the 2002 presidential election.

Existing studies on voters' ideology in the 2002 presidential election have found that voters' ideological self-placement was significantly associated with their positions on an array of issues raised during the election. Economic issues, including that of growth versus distribution, turned out to be less correlated with the perceived ideology than were political or social issues, such as North-South Korean relations, Korea-U.S. relations, national security law, domestic order, and traditional values. Among these, voter's ideological self-placement showed the strongest constraint on his or her stance toward the U.S.:

<Table 3> Presidential Vote by Ideological Self-placement:
Post-Election Survey in 2002 and 2007

Year	2002			2007		
	(N)	Lee Hoi-chang	Roh Moo-hyun	(N)	Lee Myung-bak	Chung Dong-young
Party		GNP	NMDP		GNP	UNDP
All	(1,314)	38.7	56.4	(1,931)	53.2	23.8
Progressive	(552)	20.8	71.6	(432)	34.3	37.3
Centrist	(403)	41.9	54.8	(657)	53.5	27.4
Conservative	(359)	62.7	34.8	(842)	62.6	14.0
Cramer' s V		.252***			.179***	

Note: The table shows the percentages received by the winner and the runner-up only; and the row total for one election is less than 100 percent; *** p< .01; GNP = Grand National Party, NMDP = New Millennium Democratic Party, UNDP = United New Democratic Party

Source: The 2002 post-election survey conducted by the Korean Social Science Data Center, and the 2007 post-election done by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the SBS, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research

Progressives were more likely to be anti-American than were conservatives (for detailed analysis, see Ka 2007; Kim et al. 2003; Park 2005; Back et al. 2003; Lee 2003).

In the 2007 post-election survey which provides the main data for this study, the pattern of ideological distribution among the voters has gone reverse. A respondent's ideology was measured by an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (most progressive) to 5 (middle of the road) to 10 (most conservative). When this measure was condensed into a 3-point scale, the scores of 0 through 4 were recoded into 1 (progressive); 5 into 2 (centrist); and 6 through 10 into 3 (conservative). Conservative identifiers overwhelmed progressive identifiers by 43.3 percent to 22.5 percent. And 34.2 percent located themselves on the centrist position. A new political landscape under the conservative hegemony has arisen along with Lee Myung-bak's triumph.

Has the ideological cleavage vanished this time at all? The post-election survey data in <Table 3> indicates that a moderate degree of ideological cleavage still exists. Among the progressives, 37.3 percent voted for Chung Dong-young and 34.3 percent did for Lee Myung-bak. Chung led Lee by a small margin of 3 percentage points in this group. On the other hand, Lee dominated Chung among the centrists and conservatives as well. Within the centrist group, Lee's electoral support was twice as strong as Chung's. Furthermore, within the conservative electorate, Lee enlisted support four times or so more than Chung did. The Cramer's V statistic, an indicator of the strength of relationship between voter ideology and candidate choice, is .252 for 2002 and .179 for 2007, both significant at the level of .01. One cannot conclude that the meaningful ideological cleavage has not been played out in 2007. There still exists the ideological divide in electoral support, but it has become perceptibly weaker than it was five years before.

IV. Voters' Candidate Choice in the 2007 Presidential Election

1. Voters' Socioeconomic Characteristics and Candidate Choice: Bivariate Analysis

In the post-election survey providing this study with the main data, 53.2 percent of the respondents who participated in the 2007 presidential election said that they voted for Lee Myung-bak, and 23.8 percent for Chung Dong-young. Compared with the actual official returns, the rate of support reported by the survey was 4.5 percentage points over for Lee and it was 2.3 percentage points below for Chung. Considering the sampling error, the winner was overrated slightly, but the survey results did not seriously deviate from the actual aggregate ones.

In examining the effects of voters' socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations on their candidate choice, the study looks first at the simple relationship between the determinants and the vote choice. As mentioned in the previous section, in the 2007 presidential election, electoral alignment has not sharply taken a shape of the regional divide between the East and the West. Still, there exists the divide between the Southwest and the rest or particularly the upper Southeast region (see <Table 1>). One needs to check if the survey data will also bear this out. <Table 4> shows that Lee enjoyed the highest rate of support for him—75.4 percent among the residents of the upper Southeast region, while he got the lowest 15.6 percent among the residents of the Southwest. On the other hand, Chung Dong-young upended Lee only in the Southwest, his party's stronghold, but received the poorest 7.1 percent in the upper Southeast. The survey data in <Table 4> exactly agree with the aggregate data in <Table 1>, showing the divide between the Southwest and

the rest.

The analysis based on the exit poll data in the previous section has shown the lack of generational cleavage in the 2007 presidential election, remarkably contrasting with that in 2002. The data in <Table 4> again point to this. In every age cohort, Lee came ahead of Chung in electoral support.

Even within the youngest cohort, including 19-year olds eligible for voting since 2006, Lee's support rate (46.1 percent) was more than twice as high as Chung's (21.6 percent). The age variable was recoded by taking into account only the voters who had been eligible to vote in the 2002 presidential election. Remember that in 2002 the two young cohorts (20 to 29 and 30 to 39 groups at that time, that is, 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 groups five years later) predominantly voted for Roh Moo-hyun, the progressive candidate of the MDP as opposed to the older, especially in their fifties and more, who rallied behind the conservative Lee Hoi-chang of the GNP. In the 2007 presidential election, however, the young voters followed behind the old ones in choosing Lee well above Chung. Most young voters have shifted their support from a major progressive to conservative candidate in five years, probably because they have become discontented with President Roh's ill-performance, such as growing youth unemployment and have developed pragmatism in their political thinking. Generational cleavage has become inconspicuous in the most recent presidential election.

Although clear generational cleavage lacked in the 2007 presidential election, one cannot still totally deny the effect of voters' age on candidate choice. More than 40 percent but less than half of the voters below the age of 40 supported Lee Myung-bak. His support rate monotonically increased from 53.1 percent within the cohort of 40 to 49 years old, to 57.7 percent within the 50 to 59 cohort, and up to 70.4 percent within the cohort of 60 and over. In a bivariate context, age is significantly related to the vote choice for Lee Myung-bak.

<Table 4> indicates no significant influence of sex on candidate choice, though Lee Myung-bak received a higher percentage of support among female voters than among their male counterparts. This study further considers voters' education, income, and occupation as indicators of their socioeconomic status or class. Lee Myung-bak led Chung Dong-young in any subgroup with regards to these socioeconomic status variables, indicating no clear effect of class

<Table 4> Voters' Socioeconomic Characteristics and Candidate Choice, 2007 (%)

Variables (N)	Lee Myung-bak	Chung Dong-young	Cramer's V
All(1,930)	53.2	23.8	
Region of residence			.333***
Seoul (411)	58.4	21.4	
Incheon/Gyeonggi (520)	54.2	19.8	
Central (Daejeon/Chungcheon) (201)	48.3	16.9	
Southwest (Gwangju/Jeolla) (205)	15.6	78.0	
Upper Southeast (Daegu/N. Gyeongsang) (211)	75.4	7.1	
Lower Southeast (Busan/Ulsan/ S.Gyeongsang) (304)	57.2	13.2	
Others (Gangwon/Jeju) (79)	54.4	25.3	
Sex			.046
Male (950)	50.8	25.2	
Female (980)	55.4	22.4	
Age (19 or older)			.160***
19-29 (371)	46.1	21.6	
30-39 (441)	42.0	28.6	
40-49 (450)	53.1	22.7	
50-59 (307)	57.7	26.1	
60 or more(361)	70.4	19.7	
Age (25 or older)			.140***
25-34 (440)	47.7	23.2	
35-44 (471)	44.2	28.2	
45-54 (395)	55.2	24.1	
55-64 (331)	65.3	22.1	
65 or more (182)	68.7	19.8	

Variables (N)	Lee Myung-bak	Chung Dong-young	Cramer's V
All(1,930)	53.2	23.8	
Education			.077***
Middle school or less (467)	56.5	27.0	
High school (717)	55.4	22.0	
College or more (748)	48.8	23.5	
Household income (monthly, in million won)			.073**
Less than one (209)	60.3	21.1	
1-1.99 (297)	49.5	30.6	
2-2.99 (456)	52.0	21.1	
3-3.99 (395)	48.9	27.3	
4 or more (528)	53.8	22.7	
Occupation			.146***
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery (76)	60.5	26.3	
Self-employed (396)	58.3	26.0	
Blue-collar worker (228)	43.4	32.5	
White-collar worker (460)	43.9	24.3	
Homemaker (541)	58.6	21.3	
Student (102)	45.1	16.7	
Unemployed and others (125)	68.0	12.6	

Note: The table shows the percentages received by the winner and the runner-up only, and the row total for one election is less than 100 percent; **p<.05, ***p<.01

Source: The 2007 post-election conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the SBS, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research

cleavage on voting. If the pattern of class voting existed among the Korean electorate, the voters in high socioeconomic status would be expected to support the conservative Lee Myung-bak more than those in low socioeconomic status. Contrary to this class voting hypothesis, the rate of support for Lee among the best educated (college or more) was the lowest. The pattern of relationship between voters' household income and their candidate choice also betrays the hypothesis. The highest rate of support for Lee came from the poorest income bracket. Some occupational groups were significantly

more supportive of Lee than others. But this does not clearly agree with the class voting hypothesis, either. Lee was more supported among the farmers, self-employed, housewives, and unemployed than among the blue collars, white collars, and students. By all standards, no discernible nationwide pattern of class voting can be found in the Korean electorate.

2. Voters' Ideological Perceptions and Candidate Choice: Bivariate Analysis

The preceding analysis has suggested the significant effect of voters' ideology, measured by their self-placement on the progressive/conservative continuum, on their candidate choice. Now the study further analyzes how the proximity or distance between a voter's and the candidate's perceived ideology affects the vote choice. In so doing, the study first examines whether and to what extent a voter's ideological self-identification constrains his or her positions on the issues raised during the campaign.

The post-election survey asked the respondents what they thought was the nation's most important task faced by the incoming administration. The two most frequently mentioned responses were: first, moderating economic polarization by 42.0 percent of the respondents and second, accelerating economic growth by 35.8 percent (see <Table 5>). The other problems, such as quality of life, integration of the people, political reform, international competitiveness, inter-Korean relations, or national security were mentioned by at most 7 percent of the respondents. Based on these response categories, eight dummy variables were created. Accelerating economic growth turned out to be the single dummy showing a statistically significant correlation with the voter's self-placement on the ideological continuum. The more conservative a voter is, the more likely he or she would single out economic growth as the

<Table 5> Relationship of Voters' Ideological Self-placement with Issue Positions
(Pearson's simple correlation coefficient)

Issues	Pearson's r
The nation's most important task for the next administration ^a (N = 2,081; 100%)	
Moderate economic polarization (42.0%)	-.03
Accelerate economic growth (35.8%)	.05**
Improve quality of life (6.9%)	-.03
Integrate the people (5.5%)	.01
Pursue political reform (3.5%)	-.01
Strengthen international competitiveness (2.2%)	-.01
Better North-South Korean relations (2.1%)	.00
Tighten national security (2.3%)	.04
Raise welfare spending ^b (N = 2,080)	-.03
Oppose to foreign trade expansion ^b (N = 2,080)	-.10***
Promote university autonomy ^b (N = 1,881)	.19***
Negative retrospective evaluation of President Roh's job performance ^b (N = 2,109)	.20***

Note: The progressive/conservative continuum is an 11-point scale; ^a Dummies; ^b 4-point scale; ** p<.05 *** p<.01

Source: The 2007 post-election conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the SBS, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research

nation's most important problem.


A voter's ideological orientations broadly defined in this study encompass not only the voter's perceived ideological position but also his or her stands on these ideologically relevant issues at the election time. The survey solicited the respondents' opinions on welfare spending, foreign trade, and university autonomy from government regulation. The analysis has found that a more conservative voter has significantly more favorable attitude toward the expansion of foreign trade or university autonomy. In the survey, the respondents were also asked to pass retrospective judgment on the job performance of President Roh who is regarded as ideologically progressive. The analysis has proved: the more conservative a voter is, the more likely he or

she will become negative toward President Roh's job performance. Voters' ideological self-placement on the progressive/conservative continuum has substantive meaning by constraining their attitudes toward selected issues, such as foreign trade, university autonomy, and President Roh's job performance.

<Figure 2> displays how three kinds of voters' ideological perception are distributed along the progressive/conservative continuum. One curve with the single, highest peak at the center shows the distribution of voters' self-placement on the ideological continuum. This curve is not exactly symmetric in shape, but more symmetric than the other two curves. About one third (34.2 percent) of the respondents locate themselves at the center, 22.5 percent to the left, and 43.3 percent to the right. The average score of voters' own perceived position is 5.5, meaning a largely centrist position leaning a bit toward the conservative side. The other two curves show the distribution of voters' perception about Lee Myung-bak's and Chung Dong-young's ideological positions, respectively. Roughly speaking, Lee's curve has a bimodal shape having two peaks on the right. About one fifth (21.7 percent) of the respondents place Lee at the exact center, and another fifth (19.6 percent) does so at 7 or a moderately conservative position. The average of the distribution concerning Lee's ideological position is 6.2, a moderately conservative one. The final curve portraying the voters' perception of Chung's ideological position peaks at the center: 30.5 percent of the respondents put him in the middle. This curve is denser on the left than on the right, and the average of Chung's perceived position is 4.5 or a moderately progressive one.

Let us examine the effect of a voter's ideological proximity to Lee Myung-bak or Chung Dong-young on the candidate choice. A voter's comparative ideological distance from the two candidates was computed as follows. First, the absolute value of ideological distance was obtained between a voter's self-identified position and Chung's position perceived by the voter. Second, the absolute value of ideological distance was similarly obtained between the

<Figure 2> Voters' Perception of Their Own and Candidates' Ideological Positions



Note: The progressive/conservative continuum is an 11-point scale; the number of cases ranges from 2,101 to 2,111

Source: The 2007 post-election conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the Seoul Broadcasting Service, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research

voter's self-identified position and Lee's position perceived by the voter. Third, the voter's comparative ideological distance from Lee and Chung was calculated by subtracting the value at the first step from that at the second one. A smaller negative value of comparative ideological distance means a greater degree of the voter's ideological proximity to Lee than to Chung. The value of zero tells that the voter is ideologically equidistant from these two candidates. A larger positive value indicates a greater degree of the voter's ideological proximity to Chung than to Lee.

<Table 6> provides the data on voters' comparative ideological distance from the two major candidates and their candidate choice. The respondents who voted for either Lee Myung-bak or Chung Dong-young numbered 1,472.

Those who are ideologically closer to Lee than to Chung constitute 45.3 percent of the respondents and outnumber those closer to Chung than to Lee (34.9 percent of the respondents). The remaining 19.8 percent are equidistant from the two candidates. Given this distribution of voters' comparative ideological distances from the candidates only, Lee is expected to obtain more support than Chung. In actuality, factors other than the ideological variables must have worked for Lee's victory over Chung as suggested by the fact that Lee was favored instead of Chung in any of the five groups categorized based on voters' ideological proximity to Lee or Chung. At any rate, evidence corroborates the effect of a voter's ideological proximity to the candidate on the vote choice. The voter's increasing ideological proximity to Lee monotonically strengthens the likelihood of voter's support for Lee. On the other hand, the voter's ideological proximity to Chung is positively related to the voter's choice of Chung over Lee.

<Table 6> Voters' Comparative Ideological Distance from Two Candidates (Lee Myung-bak minus Chung Dong-young), and Candidate Choice (%)

Voter's Comparative Ideological Distance from Two Candidates Lee Myung-bak minus Chung Dong-young (N)	Candidate Choice	
	Lee Myung-bak	Chung Dong-young
All (1,472)	69.0	31.0
Much closer to Lee: -10 ~ -6 (59)	93.2	6.8
Closer to Lee: -5 ~ -1 (608)	80.8	19.2
Identical: 0 (292)	67.8	32.2
Closer to Chung: 1 ~ 5 (484)	53.1	46.9
Much closer to Chung: 6 ~ 10 (29)	51.7	48.3
Cramer' s V	.282***	

Note: The row totals 100 percent; the progressive/conservative continuum is an 11-point scale; *** p<.01

Source: The 2007 post-election conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the SBS, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research

3. Effects of Voters' Socioeconomic Characteristics and Ideological Orientations on Candidate Choice: Multivariate Analysis

Now the analysis further proceeds to ascertain the effects of voters' socioeconomic characteristics and ideological orientations on the vote choice in the multivariate context where all the independent variables are simultaneously taken into account.³⁾

As a preliminary step, an Ordinary Least Square regression model was estimated. The results are displayed in <Table 7>. The dependent variable, candidate choice, was coded 0 for Chung Dong-young and 1 for Lee Myung-bak. The model explains 37.4 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.

Among the socioeconomic characteristics, sex, age, region, education, and some occupational categories have a statistically significant influence on the vote choice at the .10 or lower level. In terms of the variables' relative importance indicated by their beta coefficients, a set of regional variables stand out. In the 2007 presidential election, male voters supported Lee less than female voters. An older voter more likely endorsed Lee at the polling booth. Gangwon or Jeju being considered for reference, a voter's residence in Seoul, Incheon/Gyeonggi, Chungcheong, or Yeongnam (the Southeast) was positively related to choosing Lee over Chung, whereas residence in Honam (the Southwest) was negatively associated with such candidate choice. The better educated were more likely to vote for Lee instead of Chung. Relative to the unemployed, the voters engaged in self-employed, blue collar and white collar jobs together with homemakers were less likely to support Lee.

3) Two ideological orientation variables, a voter's respective position on the issues of university autonomy and foreign trade, were omitted from the multivariate analysis to prevent the increasing number of missing cases.

<Table 7> Effects of Voters' Socioeconomic Characteristics and Ideological Orientations on Candidate Choice, Lee Myung-bak vs. Chung Dong-young:
OLS and Binary Logistic Regressions

Independent Variables	OLS Coefficient B (S.E.)	Beta	Binary Logistic Coefficient B (S.E.)
(Constant)	-.166* (.101)		-4.349*** (.816)
Sex (reference: female)	-.043* (.025)	-.046	-.189 (.189)
Age (years old)	.002** (.001)	.073	.018** (.008)
Region of residence (reference: others)			
Seoul	.215*** (.052)	.191	.450 (.351)
Incheon/Gyeonggi	.216*** (.051)	.207	.518 (.345)
Central	.213*** (.056)	.138	.689* (.393)
Southwest	-.346*** (.056)	-.231	-2.371*** (.386)
Upper Southeast	.386*** (.056)	.258	1.868*** (.430)
Lower Southeast	.290*** (.053)	.231	.956** (.371)
Education ^a	.031* (.017)	.052	.275** (.131)
Household income ^b	.002 (.009)	.005	-.020 (.067)
Occupation(reference: unemployed)			
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery	-.075 (.064)	-.030	-.744 (.497)
Self-employed	-.179*** (.044)	-.155	-1.043*** (.400)
Blue-collar worker	-.231*** (.047)	-.164	-1.410*** (.422)
White-collar worker	-.153*** (.046)	-.143	-.904** (.415)
Homemaker	-.127*** (.047)	-.122	-.615 (.416)
Student	-.028(.060)	-.014	-.014 (.543)
Ideological Self-placement	.024*** (.006)	.101	.177*** (.047)
Voter-Candidate Ideological Distance (Lee - Chung)	-.016***(.004)	-.094	-.152*** (.032)
Most important task: economic growth	.079*** (.020)	.082	.700*** (.161)
Negative retrospective evaluation of President Roh's job performance	.170*** (.014)	.270	1.133*** (.112)
Adjusted R Square	.374		
Number of cases	1,485		1,456
Chi-square			608.744***
-2Log Likelihood			1,179.851
Cox & Snell R ²			.346

Independent Variables	OLS Coefficient B (S.E.)	Beta	Binary Logistic Coefficient B (S.E.)
Nagelkerke R ²			.486
Percentage Correct			82.5%

Note: S.E. = standard error; the progressive/conservative continuum is an 11-point scale; Central = Daejeon/Chungcheong, Southwest = Gwangju/Jeolla, Upper Southeast = Daegu/N. Gyeongsang, Lower Southeast = Busan/Ulsan/S. Gyeongsang; ^a 3-point scale; ^b 4-point scale; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Source: The 2007 post-election conducted by the East Asia Institute in collaboration with the SBS, JoongAng Daily, and Hankook Research

All of the independent variables relevant to voters' ideological orientations exert a significant impact on candidate choice at the .01 level. Interestingly, among the ideology variables, the most important variable is voters' negative retrospective evaluation of President Roh Moo-hyun's job performance, as indicated by its beta value. This has proven the widely accepted notion of the 2007 presidential election as a negative verdict by the people on President Roh and the UNDP. The more conservative a voter's self-perception was, the more likely the voter would choose Lee Myung-bak. A voter perceiving a larger distance from Lee than from Chung was less likely to support Lee. Support for Lee was more likely to come from the voters who thought of economic growth as the single most important task to be carried out by the incoming administration than from the voters who did otherwise.

More importantly, binary logistic regression analysis was conducted where the dependent variable was the probability of voting for Lee Myung-bak over Chung Dong-young. The estimated model performs reasonably well, whose goodness of empirical fit is indicated by the value of pseudo R²: Cox & Snell R² is .346 and Nagelkerke R² is .486. Based on the model, 82.5% of the cases under analysis are correctly predicted.

Among the variables which emerged statistically significant from the OLS

regression analysis, some ceased to be so in the binary logistic regression analysis. Such variables include sex, two region dummies (Seoul and Incheon/Gyeonggi), and one occupational dummy (homemaker). Others remain significant in their independent impact and also the same in its direction.

Ceteris paribus, the older were more likely to vote for Lee Myung-bak. Voters' residence in Chungcheong and Yeongnam influenced the chances of their choosing Lee over Chung Dong-young, but Honam residence worked the other way around. In particular, the voters living in the northern part of Yeongnam showed a very strong tendency of voting for Lee, and those in Honam gave him a strikingly low level of support. Voters with higher level of education had a greater probability of voting for Lee instead of Chung. In the multivariate context, the effect of education on the vote has reversed in direction as compared to the result of the bivariate analysis. The class voting hypothesis holds in the multivariate context. However, when it comes to the effect of occupation on the vote, self-employed people and those with blue or white collar jobs were much less likely to vote for Lee than the unemployed. It is suggested that voters with job security tended to be more lukewarm in supporting Lee. This result is contradictory to the class voting hypothesis. But it may tell that Lee's campaign promise of economic growth and job creation was less appealing to the voters in relatively secure jobs. Ideological orientation variables altogether maintain their significant effects on vote choice in the multivariate analysis. A more conservative voter showed a greater likelihood of choosing Lee over Chung. A longer distance from Lee in the voter's ideological perception was a prohibitive factor for supporting him. Voters who considered economic growth as the uttermost important goal for the incoming administration were more likely to vote for Lee. Again, evidence indicates that a voter's negative assessment of President Roh's job performance was a significantly positive factor for increasing the probability of voting for

Lee, the candidate of the main opposition GNP.

V. Conclusion

In the 2007 Korean presidential election, Lee Myung-bak of the GNP won a landslide victory by garnering 48.7 percent of the vote. Lee Myung-bak led his opponent Chung Dong-young in all the regions but Honam. Lee received the highest rate of support in the northern part of Yeongnam, his native region and the stronghold of his party. The East-West regional divide in the previous presidential elections has transformed into the regional cleavage of Honam versus the rest. This has been corroborated by a series of analyses using the officially election returns and survey data.

This study hardly confirms the clear existence of generational cleavage in voter alignment at the time of the 2007 presidential election. In any age cohort, Lee Myung-bak was more supported than Chung Dong-young. The lack of sharp generational cleavage notwithstanding, both the bi- and multivariate analysis of the survey data show that age is still significantly related to the vote choice of Lee Myung-bak—Older people were more likely to vote for him.

The study has sought to find the effect of class or socioeconomic status cleavage on voting. The bivariate analysis has suggested that education has a negative effect on the voter's support for Lee when both its direct and indirect effects are combined. On the other hand, the multivariate analysis shows that other factors being controlled for, education directly exerts a pure positive effect on choosing Lee in the presidential vote. In this multivariate context only, the better educated were more likely to support the major conservative candidate as suggested by the class voting hypothesis. Income suggests nothing

significant about the class cleavage in electoral support. The analysis has reached the conclusion that the self-employed and blue or white collar voters were much less likely to vote for Lee than the unemployed. This may imply that Lee's emphasis on economic growth and job creation for his campaign theme was less appealing to the voters with job security in a relative sense. But this is not what the class voting hypothesis indicates. Overall, the study is led to conclude that no nationwide discernible pattern of class voting could be found in the 2007 presidential election.

For the 2007 presidential election, a moderate degree of ideological cleavage in electoral support has been found. Ideologically progressive voters favored Chung Dong-young who was seen by most people as moderately progressive, slightly more than Lee Myung-bak, perceived by the bulk of the people as a moderate conservative. Lee dominated Chung in receiving electoral support among the centrist and conservative voters as well.

In this study, ideology was measured by the voters' self-positioning or their perception of candidates' positions on the progressive/conservative continuum. Voters' ideological self-perception had substantive meaning in the sense that it reasonably constrained their stands on selected issues during the 2007 presidential election, such as the nation's most important problem, foreign trade, university autonomy from the government, and the outgoing president's job performance. Voters who emphasized economic growth more than any other national objective indeed supported Lee Myung-bak much more strongly than Chung Dong-young. People who passed a more negative judgment on President Roh's job performance were more likely to vote for Lee who ran under the opposition GNP banner. In explaining Korean voters' candidate choice, the study applied the Downsian notion of ideological proximity. In the bi- and multivariate analysis as well, perceived ideological distance from Lee Myung-bak monotonically decreased the likelihood of voter support for him. The voter's ideological proximity to a candidate was positively related to his or

her choice of the candidate over the opponent.

Kim Dae-jung won the 1997 presidential election and succeeded in bringing about the first-time peaceful transfer of presidential power from the ruling party to the opposition since the country's transition from authoritarianism in June 1987. Lee Myung-bak's victory in the 2007 presidential election has marked the second inter-party transfer of presidential power by peaceful means. Korea has now passed what Huntington calls the "two-turnover test" (Huntington, 1991, p. 266), which signals the consolidation of Korean democracy.

The results of the 2007 presidential election have provided Lee Myung-bak with a good basis for launching his leadership on the political terrain much less rough and divided than five years ago. He has set to engage in the politics of integration with the regional, generational, and ideological cleavages having become less salient and serious. But there is no guarantee that such favorable conditions would last for long during the Lee Myung-bak administration. The young generation, now seemingly more absorbed in jobs, livelihood matters, real life goals, and pragmatic values than before, may give a vent to its pent-up desire for change in no time. Ideological cleavage looks dormant. In the 2002 presidential election, progressive voters were triumphant. Five years afterwards, the conservatives have hegemony over the progressives. Korean voters' ideological dispositions shift easily due to the influences arising from turbulent events and persistent mobilization efforts. People dynamically respond to what the government has done and how.

During the recent years under the progressive President Roh Moo-hyun's leadership, distribution-oriented rather than growth-oriented policies were emphasized. Despite this, the country has faced an increasing degree of economic polarization. Real household income is growing slowly, annually in the neighborhood of two percent or so. The Gini coefficient, a measure of income distribution, has recorded the highest value of .352 in 2007 since 2003.

Over the same period, the income distribution ratio between households in the top 20 percent and those in the bottom 20 percent has also increased to 7.66 in 2007 (“Country’s income disparity worsens,” *Korea Herald*, February 15, 2008). Under these conditions, why is one not able to find a nationwide pattern of class voting in the 2007 presidential election? It was because low-income voters supported the moderately conservative Lee Myung-bak more than any progressive candidate. As a national leader, Lee has shouldered a burden of achieving two often clashing goals almost simultaneously. He is a neoliberal politician stressing economic growth based on market-oriented and business-friendly policies. Under his policy scheme, economic growth will create more jobs, which will in turn generate effects of easing economic polarization. If his policy does not deliver much on the matter of economic polarization, it will be raised as a major political issue and the class cleavage may emerge significant on the political arena. The existence of any cleavage based on class or ideology is not necessarily detrimental to democratic consolidation on Korean soil. Korean democracy can advance if the disintegrating effects of the cleavage can be addressed through rational discussion and institutionalized policy competition.

[REFERENCES]

- Back, Jun-Kee, Jung-kwan Cho, and Sungdai Cho. 2003. "Ideology, Regionalism, and the 2002 Korean Presidential Election." *National Strategy*, 9:4, 139-168 [in Korean].
- Berelson, B. R., P. F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. Evanston: Row, Peterson.
- Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.
- Cho, Choongbin. 2003. "The 2002 Presidential Election and Political Generation." Presented at the spring meeting of the Korean Political Science Association [in Korean].
- Chung, Jin Min. 1995. "A Generational Analysis of the 1992 Presidential Election in Korea." *Korean Social Science Journal*, 22, 145-164.
- Dalton, Russell J. 2002. "Political Cleavages, Issues, and Electoral Change." In Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris, eds. *Comparing Democracies II: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. Sage Publications.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Enelow, James M., and Melvin J. Hinich. 1984. *Spatial Theory of Voting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Juang, Hoon. 2003. *President Roh Moo-hyun and the New Politics of South Korea*. New York: Asia Society.
- Ka, Sangjoon. 2007. "The 2007 Presidential Election and Ideology." *The Journal of NGO Studies*, 5:1, 27-58 [in Korean].

- Kang, Won-Taek. 2003. *Electoral Politics in South Korea: Ideology, Region, Generation and Media*. Seoul: Pureungil [in Korean].
- Key, V. O. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Kim, Ju-chan, and Seongyi Yun. 2003. "The Influence of Ideology in the 2002 Presidential Election." *21st Century Political Science Review*, 13:2, 1-17 [in Korean].
- Kim, Man-heum. 2003. "The 2002 Presidential Election and Regionalism." In Kim Se-kyun, ed. *The Electoral Process and Significance of the 2002 Presidential Election*. Seoul National University Press [in Korean].
- Kim, Wook. 2006. "Influences of Generation, Ideology, and Values in the 2002 Presidential Election." In Soo Young Auh, ed. *Korean Election V: The 2002 Presidential Election and the 2004 General Election for the National Assembly*. Seoul: Oreum [in Korean].
- Knutsen, O. 1995. "Value Orientations, Political Conflicts, and Left-Right Identification: A Comparative Study." *European Journal of Political Research*, 28:1, 63-93.
- Lazasfeld, Paul, Bernard Berelson, and Helen Gaudet. 1944. *The People's Choice*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- LeDuc, Lawrence, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris, eds. 2002. *Comparing Democracies II: New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting*. Sage Publications.
- Lee, Junhan. 2003. "Major Issues and Voter's Choice in the 2002 Presidential Election." In Kim Se-kyun, ed. *The Electoral Process and Significance of the 2002 Presidential Election*. Seoul National University Press [in Korean].
- Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan, eds. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignment*. New York: Macmillan.
- Nie, Norman, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Park, Chan Wook. 2000. "Elections in Democratizing Korea." In Fuh-sheng and David Newman, eds. *How Asia Votes*. New York: Chatham House.
- _____. 2005. "Social Cleavage and Voters' Candidate Choice in Korea: An Analysis of the

- 2002 Presidential Election.” In Yoshiaki Kobayashi and Hyug Bag Im, eds. *Political Process in Civil Society* [in Japanese].
- Park, Myung-Ho. 2007. “A Presidential Election and Generation: focusing the 386 Political Generation.” *The Korean Regional Politics Review*, 1:2, 53-70 [in Korean].
- Riker, William H., and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting.” *American Political Science Review*, 62: 1, 25-42.
- Song, Ho-keun, 2003. *What is Happening in Korea: Generation and Aesthetics of Its Conflict and Harmony*. Samsung Economic Institute [in Korean].
- Walker, Scott, and Kyung-Tae Kang. 2004. “The Presidential Election in South Korea, December 2002.” *Electoral Studies*, 23:4, 840-845.
- Yoon, Jong-Bin. 2007. “The Metropolitan Voting Behavior in the 2007 Presidential Election; Regionalism, Ideology and Candidate Factors.” *Korean Party Studies Review*, 6:2, 65-95 [in Korean].

[논문요약]

2007 한국 대선에서 사회균열이 유권자의 투표선택에 미친 영향

박찬욱 | 서울대학교

이 논문은 2007년 한국 대통령 선거에서 유권자의 사회경제적 특성과 이데올로기적 정향이 후보선택에 미친 효과를 분석한다. 유권자의 거주지역이 미친 영향은 호남 대 비호남의 지역균열에 의하여 분명하게 나타났다. 선명한 세대균열이 존재하지는 않았으나 나이가 많은 투표자일수록 이명박 후보를 지지하였다. 계급투표의 형태가 분명히 드러나지는 않았지만 선거지지에 있어서 이데올로기적 균열은 어느 정도 발견되었다. 진보성향 유권자들은 이명박 후보보다는 정동영 후보에 대하여 호의적이었으며, 중도성향과 보수성향 유권자들은 정 후보보다는 이 후보를 압도적으로 선택하였다. 유권자가 자신의 이데올로기에 대하여 갖는 주관적 인식은 국가가 당면한 가장 중요한 문제나 퇴임하게 될 노무현 대통령의 직무수행과 같은 특정한 쟁점에 대하여 그 유권자의 입장을 제약하였다. 노 대통령의 직무수행을 부정적으로 평가하는 사람일수록 제1야당의 이 후보에 표를 던질 가능성이 높았다. 유권자와 이 후보 간의 이념적 거리는 그에 대한 지지를 단조적으로 낮추었다. 전반적으로, 지역, 세대 및 이념 균열은 이전 선거보다는 약화되었다. 이 후보는 덜 분열적인 정치적 환경에서 그의 국가적 리더십을 행사하게 되었던 것이다. 이명박 대통령의 리더십 양식과 성과에 따라 선거 지지에 반영되는 사회균열의 형태는 변화할 것이다. 한국의 유권자들은 정부가 무엇을 어떻게 하는가에 동태적으로 반응한다.

